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Resumen 
Este trabajo examina el Plan Colombia (2000-2012), una iniciativa an-
ti-narcóticos que erogó $8 mil millones de dólares. El análisis se hace 
desde la perspectiva teórica de las relaciones internacionales; en parti-
cular, desde el realismo, liberalismo y constructivismo, con el propó-
sito de comprender la formulación y evolución del mismo, finalizan-
do con un exhaustivo examen de si esta estrategia logró sus metas, así 
como las consecuencias del mismo. 
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Abstract
The work analyzes Plan Colombia (2000-2012), an $8 billion counter-
narcotics initiative. The articles applies international relations theories, 
particularly realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to understand the 
formation and evolution of Plan Colombia.  This work also examines 
whether Plan Colombia achieved its goals, as well as the consequences 
of Plan Colombia.
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Colombia has been at the center of the U.S. led war on drugs for many decades. This article will analyze Plan Colombia (2000 to 2012) and 
answer several questions.  First, what is Plan Colombia, and how did Plan 
Colombia come to fruition?  Second, what were the goals of Plan Colom-
bia, and have they been achieved?  What have the consequences of Plan 
Colombia been, particularly for other countries? This work argues that 
Plan Colombia has failed to stop drug trafficking and has been counter-
productive for Colombia.  International relations theories such as realism, 
constructivism, and interdependence theory will be used to analyze the 
development of Plan Colombia.1  These theories are very helpful for ex-
plaining grand strategy but have limits, particularly with foreign policy 
analysis.  Therefore, this work also will examine various other elements, 
such as domestic factors, that led to the creation of Plan Colombia.2
Approach
An eclectic approach is necessary to explain the formation of Plan Colom-
bia.  The field of international relations has often been divided into camps. 
Many theorists praise the importance and explanatory power of their the-
ory and fail to recognize the weaknesses of a particular theory.  Scholars 
should not allow theories and methods to drive their research, but instead 
should use the appropriate approaches necessary to answer the research 
question. During an interview, Robert Pape was asked whether he is a re-
alist.  In his response, Pape stated that he does not want to classify himself 
as a realist and desires for his questions to determine his research.  This 
is the best way to conduct political science research, and scholars should 
invoke the appropriate methods or theories required in the research de-
1  See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK; 
New York : Cambridge University Press, 429.;Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 290.; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye 
S., Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition w(New York: Harper 
Collins, 315.; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Ill. : 
Waveland Press, 251.; Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, Security : a New 
Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 239.
2  Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in A Globalized Era (Lan-
ham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
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sign.3 In this vein, an eclectic theoretical lens will be used to analyze Plan 
Colombia.
 Foreign policy as a field of study lies between comparative politics and in-
ternational relations, and requires various tools of analysis, such as inter-
national relations theory.  Mega theories, such as realism and liberalism 
have a great amount of explanatory power, but these theories alone have 
limitations when analyzing foreign policy.  Realism, for instance, focuses 
on explaining the international system, and, therefore, subordinates do-
mestic politics.  This, however, does not imply that realism is not useful 
in foreign policy analysis, but rather that it has limitations.4 For example, 
scholars must examine the policy and decision making processes to un-
derstand how policies are developed in the U.S.5 
Realism 
Realism provides a great deal of explanatory power when analyzing U.S. 
foreign policy. In Man,	the	State,	and	War, Kenneth Waltz, the founder of 
neo-realism, discusses the different levels of analysis that one can use to 
study international relations. The first level focuses on human behavior, 
while the second level concentrates on the internal dynamics of the state; 
the third level analyzes the international system and anarchy.  In Theory 
of International Politics, Waltz rejects the first two images and argues that 
scholars studying international relations must focus on the third image.6 
This represents a break from classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, 
and E.H. Carr, who emphasize the role of human nature.  
3 A Conversation with History: Robert Pape, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-
HXLdwuFi7Q (accessed 2/18, 2012);Robert Anthony Pape , Bombing to Win : Air Pow-
er and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press), 366.
4  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York : Norton, 555.; 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man,	the	State,	and	War: (New York,: Columbia University Press), 
263.; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 251
5  Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking In A Globalized Era
6  Waltz, Man,	 the	State,	and	War:, 263; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 251; 
John J. Mearsheimer,, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 2001),
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Waltz differs from classical realists because he does not focus on individ-
uals.  Instead, neo-realism argues that states are unitary actors and are 
like black-boxes.  The analogy of billiards is useful because it can be used 
to explain how the system functions.  In the game of pool, billiard balls 
crash into each other.  Waltz argues that the internal dynamics of the state 
are not important.  Therefore, it does not matter if the state is a democ-
racy or a communist regime.  For neo-realists, the leaders of the state are 
rational actors.  Critics could disagree and argue that individual leaders 
do indeed matter.  For neo-realists, the main goal of a state is to survive 
in the international system, which is anarchic in nature. This means that 
no world police exists to resolve conflicts.  Mearsheimer refers to this as 
the 911 problem because a state cannot call the world police or 911 when 
a crisis ensues.  Anarchy, therefore, is the defining characteristic of the 
international system.7  
Constructivism
Constructivism is another theoretical lens used to analyze international re-
lations. Constructivists respond to realists and liberals and argue that both 
of these groups of scholars do not consider the role of social constructions, 
norms, and values, which play a crucial role in the study of international 
politics.  A person desiring to study the world must understand how values 
and perceptions impact the manner in which different individuals see the 
world.  The manner in which actors view the world will impact how a per-
son defines problems, as well as the solutions to various dilemmas. 
Scholars who adhere to thin constructivism assert that perceptions are 
very important and must be analyzed to understand how and why various 
policies have been created. In particular, thin constructivism focuses on 
ideas, identity values, and norms.8  Scholars, such as John Ruggie, devel-
oped the concept of embedded liberalism, which emphasizes how institu-
tions are embedded with certain values, norms, and ideas.9  The notion of 
7  See Waltz, op. cited.  See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Poli-
tics, ch. 1-3.
8  Constructivism is divided between thin and thick or hard and soft constructivism. 
For more on constructivism, see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 429
9  John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2, In-
ternational Regimes (Spring, 1982), pp. 379-415.
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embedded liberalism requires theorists to examine who wrote the “rules 
of the game” and designed the institutions.  
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, members of what is known 
as  the Copenhagen School, challenge the realist conception of security. 
Realists, for instance, focus on state security.  Buzan and his colleagues 
developed a framework for analyzing security based on different sectors 
and levels of analysis.10 The question becomes security for what and for 
whom?  Buzan and his colleagues discuss the process of securitization. 
In order to examine how something becomes securitized, scholars can 
analyze speech acts of key actors.  In addition, analysts must examine the 
allocation of financial resources to determine if an issue was effectively 
securitized.11
Interdependence Theory
Two forms of interdependence exist: complex and asymmetric.  Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye developed complex interdependence to explain 
the international system.  In Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition,	Keohane and Nye explain the linkages that exist between states 
and prevent them from entering into war.12  Realists, in particular, focus 
on supply-side issues and ignore the role of the interconnections between 
Colombia and the U.S. in the war on drugs. Bruce Bagley and Juan To-
katlian argue that “to create the conditions for a consensual regime, it is 
essential that the U.S. administration first develop an alternative analysis 
of the international political economy of drugs that takes into account 
the complex interdependence nature of the transnational economic busi-
ness.”13  In other words, the U.S. must rethink the definition and solution 
to the problem and focus on demand and avoid concentrating only on 
10  Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Stud-
ies in the Post-Cold War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 262.
11  Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security : a New Framework for Analysis, 239
12  Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 315
13  Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, “Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure 
of U.S.-Latin American Drug Poicies,” in The United States of Latin America in the 
1990s: Beyond the Cold War, eds. Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultzs and Augusto Varas 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
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combatting the supply of drugs.  This requires a fundamental shift away 
from the realist paradigm and cannot occur without recognition of the 
linkages between drug consuming countries and the states involved in the 
cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs. This is an arduous task 
and requires cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and other 
countries to combat drug trafficking and production by using a multilat-
eral framework.14   
History of Drug Trafficking in Colombia
Colombia has had a long history of drug trafficking since the days of Pab-
lo Escobar and his notorious Medellín cartel.  The strategy for disman-
tling the cartels during this time has been referred to by scholars, such as 
Russell Crandall, as the kingpin strategy; the kingpin strategy sought to 
demolish the cartels by attacking and destroying the leaders of these orga-
nizations. After the destruction of the major cartels, such as the Medellin 
and Cali cartels, the production and trafficking of drugs did not end.  In-
stead, Colombia witnessed the fragmentation of the cartels into smaller 
groups and organizations which sought to enter into the market and fill 
the void left by the collapse of the major drug trafficking organizations.15 
Washington provided nearly one billion dollars in aid to the Colombian 
government during the 1990s, desiring to significantly alter the produc-
tion and trafficking of drugs.  Drug production continued to prosper de-
spite such large amounts of assistance, and Colombia became the number 
14  Bruce Michael Bagley, “US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a 
Policy Failure,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 2/3, Spe-
cial Issue: Assessing the Americas’ War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), pp. 189-
212.; Bagley and Tokatlian, Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S.-Latin 
American Drug Policies; Bruce Michael Bagley, “The New Hundred Years War? US 
National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 161-182.; Bruce Michael Bag-
ley and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “Colombian Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The Search 
for Leverage,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 3 (Autumn, 
1985), pp. 27-62.
15  Crandall, Russell, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne  Publishers, 2002). 
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one cultivator of coca by the end of the 1990s.16  Before providing some 
statistics, it is important to note that differences in statistics do occur and 
statistical analysis is not a full-proof system.  Drug production and drug 
trafficking are illegal, and drug cartels do not provide information to the 
government about how much the organizations earn, grow, and traffic.  It 
should be noted that coca, however, is not the same as cocaine, and it is 
quite intensive to refine coca into cocaine. Coca also is used to make other 
products, such as tea and toothpaste and has various medicinal uses. For 
example, people chew coca leafs to combat altitude sickness in the Andes.
Over the decade from 1989 to 1998, Colombia experienced a 140 per-
cent increase in the levels of coca being produced in the country. Bagley 
asserts, “Even more remarkable, 1999 coca leaf production more than 
doubled the 1998 tons, reaching an estimated 220 lons”.17 Bagley also 
notes the drastic increases in production that occurred from 1996 to 
1999, stating, “These dramatic increases in overall production reflect-
ed the fact that between 1996 and 1999, the total number of hectares 
of coca leaf under cultivation in Colombia rose by almost 100 percent, 
from 68,280 to 120,000 hectares”.18  These large increases in the percent-
age of cultivation occurred even though the Colombian authorities rig-
orously tried to thwart coca cultivation.  The aerial eradication program 
has been the main operation used to combat coca by spraying the hect-
ares under cultivation.  Aerial spraying, as the name implies, is when an 
airplane flies over crops and sprays them with pesticides.  In 1998, the 
Colombian government sprayed 65,000 hectares of coca, yet the levels 
of coca production still proliferated.19
Colombia not only managed to grow large amounts of coca leaves, more 
than both Bolivia and Peru during this period, but Colombia also pro-
duced and refined cocaine.  In 1999, Colombia maintained its position as 
16   Bruce, B. “Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 
1990s”. This unpublished work can be accessed at the Mama coca website: http://www.
mamacoca.org/junio2001/bagley_drugs_and_violence_en.htm  
17  Bruce, B. “Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 
1990s,”. 1 This unpublished work can be accessed at the Mama coca website: http://www.
mamacoca.org/junio2001/bagley_drugs_and_violence_en.htm 
18  Ibid., 1
19  Ibid., 1
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the top refiner of cocaine in the world despite the aforementioned efforts 
by the Colombian government and the financial support of Washington. 
Statistically, Colombia supplied approximately 80 percent of the total 
amount of cocaine that reached the illegal drug market in the U.S. in 1999 
alone.20 Although not a major producer and distributor, Colombia also 
produces heroin.  Over a ten year period, the production of opium poppy 
increased from zero to 61 metric tons being produced.   Opium, a raw 
material like coca, is refined to produce heroin.  By the end of the 1990s, 
the Colombians accounted for a small amount of the world’s heroin sup-
ply; yet, this supply is still trafficked to major cities on the east coast of the 
U.S.21  Along with heroin, the Colombians continue to produce significant 
amounts of marijuana but less money and potential profits can be gained 
from the trafficking of marijuana.  Colombian traffickers, for example, 
provided the U.S. market with 40 percent of its total marijuana supply in 
1999, as well as the previous year.  As a caveat, this statistic only includes 
the marijuana imported into the country and does not include marijuana 
grown and produced domestically within the U.S.  In sum, the previous 
examples illustrate that the drug traffickers received profits from various 
illegal products.22
Other Actors in Colombia
Colombia is a very complicated case study due to its complex history. One 
of its most notable events is the internal armed conflict in Colombia that 
has existed for fifty years.  The primary guerrilla organization is the left-
ist organization known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionaries de Co-
lombia (FARC).  The FARC participate in various elements of organized 
crime including drug trafficking, robbery, kidnapping, and various other 
criminal activities.  By the end of the 1990s, the FARC earned an estimat-
ed $400 million per year from drug trafficking.23  It is clear, then, that the 
FARC earns a significant amount of money from the drug trade.   It, how-
ever, would be wrong to assume that the FARC would stop operating and 
20  Ibid., 2
21  Ibid., 2.  
22  Ibid., 2, 7
23  Ibid., 7
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fighting the government if revenue from drug trafficking declined. The 
FARC is innovative and would increase its operations in other activities 
to gain revenue, such as kidnappings and extortions.24    
The FARC is not the only group operating within Colombia as various 
other leftist organizations exist within the country. The ELN is the second 
largest leftist group in Colombia, but the ELN “does not appear to have 
engaged systematically in drug trafficking activities during the 1990s”.25 
The ELN26 has earned money through different forms of illegal activities, 
such as extortion and kidnapping.27  This is another example of why the 
war in Colombia would continue even if drug trafficking did not play a 
role or serve as a source of income for the leftists militias.  While other 
groups exist, such as the right wing paramilitaries, this work does not fo-
cus on the armed conflict in Colombia and seeks only to acknowledge the 
role of such actors in drug trafficking.  
Formation of Plan Colombia
This section will examine the formation of Plan Colombia and will be 
followed by a theoretical analysis that will explain why the initiative de-
veloped the way that it did.  The goal is to answer the following questions: 
what is Plan Colombia, and how did the initiative evolve?  The U.S. gov-
ernment had a relationship with President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) 
that can best be described as cantankerous. Washington was more excited 
to work with Andrés Pastrana and his administration (1998-2002), which 
succeeded President Samper.  Russell Crandall argues, “This did not 
mean, however, that the United States failed to make it clear to Pastrana 
that he too would have to comply with U.S.-led counternarcotic efforts”.28 
President Pastrana developed Plan Colombia in 1999 in order to respond 
24  Ibid., 7.  For more on the FARC, see Murphy, John, “The IRA and the FARC in Co-
lombia”. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 1 (-12-20, 
2004): 76-88. 
25  Ibid. 
26  This is another guerrillas organization in Colombia. 
27  Ibid.
28  Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Publishers, 2002), 145.
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to the inordinate amount of violence occurring in Colombia.  Pastrana 
had several goals in mind when developing the initiative.  First, he want-
ed to focus on peace within Colombia and combat the large amounts of 
violence occurring within the country.  The U.S. became concerned with 
Pastrana’s desire to promote and facilitate negotiations with the FARC. 
As a result, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution stipulating that it would 
“cut off counternarcotics assistance to Colombia if Pastrana’s peace ini-
tiatives—especially the proposed plan to grant the FARC a demilitarized 
zone- interfered with coca eradication efforts”.29  Second, Pastrana wanted 
to develop programs to help promote and support social and economic 
development in the country. For Pastrana, drug trafficking was a tertia-
ry issue. The Clinton Administration did not agree with the agenda of 
Plan Colombia and reversed the order of the Plan proposed by Pastrana, 
requiring Colombia to focus first and foremost on drug trafficking.  The 
Clinton Administration viewed Colombia as a serious threat to national 
security but made a clear distinction between drugs and counterinsurgen-
cy operations. 
The original estimates for Plan Colombia in terms of financial costs were 
$7.5 billion.  The U.S. would supply the Colombians with $4 billion, while 
the rest of the resources would come from the international communi-
ty.30  The international community, however, did not support the initiative 
because it disagreed with the formula of Plan Colombia; therefore, Plan 
Colombia was financed entirely by the U.S. government.  Washington was 
not interested in working through institutions and cooperating with oth-
er countries in order to solve drug trafficking, which by definition, is an 
international problem that requires coordination, collaboration, and co-
operation.  Plan Colombia was primarily funded by the Andean Counter-
drug Initiative (ACI).  The U.S. Congress passed a law which provided the 
Colombians with $1.3 billion to be used for various projects, such as drug 
interdiction.  From the fiscal years of 2000 through 2005, the ACI pro-
gram provided the Colombians with an estimated $2.8 billion to combat 
drug trafficking in the region.  The amount spent by the U.S. increased to 
29  Ibid., 145. 
30  Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 
2005) 1
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$4.5 billion after considering other areas of funding, such as money from 
the Department of Defense and Foreign Military Financing.31 
President Clinton signed Plan Colombia into law in 2000.  From the begin-
ning, Plan Colombia was a flawed strategy as 80 percent of the resources 
were allocated to what is referred to as “hard” components (the military, 
aerial spraying, etc), while only 20 percent of the resources supported 
“soft” programs such as alternative development and crop substitution. 
The Clinton administration failed to learn from history and continued the 
implementation of supply-side strategies. Supply-side strategies ignore 
underlying problems such as demand and weak institutions.  The mili-
tarization of the war on drugs does nothing to address the demand side of 
the problem.32  The logic is that drug traffickers will continue to produce 
and traffic drugs as long as a market exists.  
Realism helps explain how the U.S. used its power and hegemonic sta-
tus in the region to re-formulate Plan Colombia.33  The U.S. is the most 
powerful country in the world and can dominate the events that transpire 
in Latin America.34 As the global hegemon, the U.S. believes that it has 
the right and obligation to intervene in backward countries and seeks to 
improve its security in order to maintain its position in the internation-
al system.  This argument has been put forward by Adrián Bonilla, who 
emphasizes the abysmal U.S. record of intervening in sovereign countries 
in Latin America. Drug trafficking from Colombia is a security issue for 
the U.S. for several reasons.35  First, drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, 
are highly addictive and are quite dangerous.  One does not have to think 
back too far to remember the crack boom and the devastating effects that 
crack-cocaine had on inner city populations in major cities, such as New 
31  Ibid., 1
32  For more on the militarization of the war on drugs, see Adam Isacson, “The U.S. 
Military in the War on Drugs.” In Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne, 
2005). 
33  Waltz, Man, the State, and War:, 263; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 251
34 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,  ch. 1-4.
35  Adrián Bonilla, “The U.S. Andean Policy, the Colombian Conflict and Security in 
Ecuador”. In Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean 
Region, edited by Brian Loveman, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Publish-
ers, Inc., 2006). 
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York.  Second, drugs also are trafficked and distributed, which has result-
ed in enormous amounts of violence within the U.S.36  
Realism, however, has various weaknesses when analyzing foreign poli-
cy.  Kenneth Waltz, did not strive to explain bilateral relations between 
two countries.  Instead, he wanted to understand the international system 
and how the world functions by focusing on high politics, as opposed to 
low politics.  As previously mentioned, states are the units of analysis for 
neo-realists and are like black-boxes or billiard balls.  This means that 
what is happening within a country does not matter.  These assumptions 
are problematic for several reasons.  Drug traffickers are non-state actors 
and, therefore, are not the focus of attention for neo-realists.37  In addi-
tion, it is quite difficult to analyze foreign policy without looking at the 
internal dynamics within a country. For example, one of the reasons why 
President Clinton signed Plan Colombia into law was to silence Republi-
can critics who argued that he was soft on drugs.38
Realism also downplays the importance of markets and the forces of glo-
balization.  Bagley and Tokatlian state that “the realists’ state-primacy as-
sumption ignores, or gravely underestimates the relative autonomy of the 
international market forces involved in the drug trade and the concomi-
tant capacity of the drug traffickers to circumvent, adapt to, or defy state 
efforts to regulate or eradicate their illicit multimillion dollar industry”.39 
The trafficking of illegal substances arouses many sentiments among dif-
ferent people and “morale entrepreneurs” have demonized the use of drug 
trafficking.40  Drugs, like any other commodity, have a market where buy-
ers sell to consumers demanding the drugs. Washington, therefore, must 
view drug trafficking as a supply and demand problem as opposed to just 
a supply-side issue.  
36  David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 414.
37  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 251
38  Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia, Ch 4-5. 
39  Bagley and Tokatlian, Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S.-Latin 
American Drug Policies,218
40  Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime 
Control in International Relations (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press), 333.
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Realists also ignore the role of economic linkages. The Colombians and 
the U.S. have various connections, but the number of linkages between 
the two countries is not great enough for the relationship to be defined as 
complex interdependence.  One of the linkages is the drug trade as various 
drugs are trafficked to the U.S.  The asymmetrical relationship between 
Colombia and the U.S. helps explain the formation of Plan Colombia as it 
emphasizes the fact that the U.S. does not need assistance or money from 
Colombia to succeed and prosper.  On the other hand, Colombia depends 
on the economic resources and support of the U.S. to stop drug trafficking 
and decrease violence in Colombia.  Ultimately, the asymmetrical rela-
tionship helps the U.S. define the rules and design policies.41  
Constructivism helps explain the formation of the initiative. The U.S. and 
the Colombian government had different definitions of the problem when 
developing Plan Colombia.  How a government defines a problem is a 
constructivist issue.  The U.S. government, under President Clinton’s lead-
ership, wanted to focus on altering the trafficking of drugs, as well as the 
production of drugs in Colombia.  Washington was less concerned about 
peace and did not want to spend the majority of the money financing the 
different “soft” programs, such as economic and alternative development 
strategies.  The Clinton administration rejected the ideas of Pastrana and 
decided that 80 percent of the money would be spent on programs de-
signed to support the military as well as interdiction and aerial spraying. 
The Colombian government, on the other hand, defined the problem dif-
ferently than the U.S. government. Washington, however, disagreed with 
the Pastrana administration and used its hegemonic status and influence 
to construct a different Plan Colombia.  In sum, constructivism is quite 
useful and helps explain how perceptions and ideas played a role in the 
development of Plan Colombia, which clearly was a flawed strategy from 
the beginning.42  
41  For more on asymmetrical relationships, see  Bagley, Bruce and Juan G. Tokatlian. 
“Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S.-Latin America Drug Policies”. In 
Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoulz and Augusto Varas, (eds.), The United States and Latin 
America in the 1990s, Beyond the Cold War (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1992), 214-234.
42  Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia; Loveman, Addicted to Failure. Also, see Plan 
Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals were Not Fully Met, but Security has Improved; U.S. 
Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance, (Washington D.C.: GAO, 
2008); Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals were Not Fully Met, but Security has 
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The War on Terror
U.S. foreign policy regarding drug trafficking has evolved over time.  The 
events of September 11th, 2001 changed the focus and priorities of the U.S. 
government.  The Bush administration launched what has become known 
as the Global War on Terrorism and promised to support countries in the 
fight against terrorism.  In terms of U.S. foreign policy, everything became 
subordinated to the war on terror.  In Policing	the	Globe, Criminal ization 
and Crime Control in International Relations, Peter Andreas and Ethan 
Nadelmann have an excellent quote by a DEA official which explains the 
shift in the conceptualization of security after 9/11.  The agent stated that 
“‘prior to September 11th, 2011, the law enforcement community typically 
addressed drug trafficking and terrorist activities as separate issues.  In 
the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and 
Pennsylvania, these two criminal activities are virtually intertwined”.43 
 The Copenhagen School helps scholars understand how the war on drugs 
became re-branded and securitized under the auspices of the war on ter-
ror.  Buzan and his colleagues discuss the role of securitization and the 
process of securitizing an issue. The Bush Administration securitized the 
war on terrorism, stressing the importance of combating drug trafficking 
and other criminal activities, which help finance insurgent movements.44 
Bush and the neoconservatives in his administration rebranded the drug 
war in order to “sell” the importance of financing counternarcotics oper-
ations to the American public.  Andreas and Nadelmann assert that “the 
repackaging of the war on drugs as part of the war on terrorism was es-
pecially critical in maintaining political support for growing levels of U.S. 
security assistance to Colombia, where the line between fighting drugs 
and fighting insurgents was becoming progressively blurred”.45 
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance : Report 
to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate, 108; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 429; Buzan, Weaver and de 
Wilde, Security : a New Framework for Analysis, 239
43  Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe : Criminalization and Crime Control 
in International Relations,197.  
44  Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security : a New Framework for Analysis, 239
45  Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe : Criminalization and Crime Control 
in International Relations, 333
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 In Colombia, President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) came to power prom-
ising a tougher stance on the various armed groups operating in Colom-
bia. Connie Veillette argues that “he increasingly equated the guerrillas 
with drug traffickers and terrorists, and initiated a military campaign, 
called Plan Patriota, to recapture guerrilla-controlled territory”.46 Uribe’s 
commitment to fighting the insurgents signaled the beginning of a coop-
erative relationship between the Bush and Uribe Administrations.  Uribe 
managed to alter the goals of Plan Colombia as well as the perceptions of 
the internal armed conflict, stating that Colombia has a terrorist problem 
as opposed to an internal armed conflict.47 Uribe viewed drugs as part 
of the problem as the FARC, or narco-guerrillas in Colombia, trafficked 
drugs and participate in various other illegal activities to finance their 
operations.  The number one goal for the Uribe administration was to 
defeat the terrorists within Colombia and increase security.   President 
Bush accepted the fusion of the war on drugs with the war on terror in 
Colombia.  Therefore, the smaller and less powerful country, Colombia, 
had a tremendous influence on the agenda of Plan Colombia, instead of 
the U.S. using its power and stronger position as the regional hegemon to 
reverse the formula. Uribe completely ignored various other issues, such 
as human rights abuses, focusing all of his energy on defeating the nar-
co-guerrillas. 
Counterproductive Measures: Aerial Spraying
The United States government has spent billions of dollars on aerial eradi-
cation efforts, where airplanes fly over targets in Colombia and spray coca 
leafs.  Such tactics have been very controversial, particularly because of its 
many negative consequences.   Aerial eradication programs are not only 
ineffective but have been counterproductive and very costly. An airplane 
that sprays pesticides from the ground can have various harmful effects 
for the environment.48  Aerial eradication programs also have had nega-
tive effects on the health and well-being of people residing in Colombia. 
Producers can intermix the plant with other crops making it very difficult 
46  Veillette, Plan Colombia, 2
47  Marc Chernick, Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, 2012.  Approved by Institutional Re-
view Board of the University of Miami. 
48  Veillette, Plan Colombia.
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to identify from the sky. Despite all these efforts, the area under cultiva-
tion in one region in Colombia increased by 27 percent in 2008.49 
Alternative Development
The financing of Plan Colombia has been controversial, and critics are 
quick to point out that Plan Colombia focuses on the military and not 
enough money has been spent on alternative development.  In particular, 
Plan Colombia has failed to address the underlying developmental issues 
in Colombia.  A security issue exists that requires campesinos (peasants) 
to grow coca.  A peasant desiring to grow another item, such as oranges, 
does not have a choice if a member of the FARC orders the peasants to 
cultivate coca.  In addition to the various security issues, a peasant faces 
a variety of environmental challenges as other crops are not as resilient as 
coca in the harsh Colombian environment. One also must remember that 
Colombia is composed of the Andes Mountains and the jungle, which 
creates a problem in terms of transportation.  Even if Colombian peasants 
could grow other crops, the lack of infrastructure makes it very difficult 
for goods to reach the market before they spoil.50
Has Plan Colombia Been Successful?
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that Plan Colombia has been 
unsuccessful in stopping drug production and coca cultivation.  Advo-
cates of Plan Colombia argue that security increased and overall levels 
of coca cultivation decreased.51 In reality, the coca routes have shifted to-
wards Bolivia and Peru as a result of the governmental efforts in Colom-
bia.52  In addition, drug trafficking routes moved to other countries. Plan 
Colombia, therefore, has had negative consequences, as other countries 
49  See Romero, Simon, “Cocaine Sustains War in Rural Colombia,” The New York 
Times, 2008, sec. Americas. See also Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia; Loveman, Ad-
dicted to Failure. 
50  Francisco Thoumi, The Size of the Illegal Drugs Industry in Colombia, 20
51  Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, Phillip McLean, Back from the Brink: Evaluating 
Progress in Colombia, 1999–2007 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007). 
52  Sibylla Brodzinsky. “Colombia out, Peru in, as coca king. What’s that mean?” The 
Christian Science Monitor, September 2013, Sec. World. 
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have become victims of the U.S. led war on drugs.  Constructivism helps 
explain the differences of opinions in terms of the successes of Plan Co-
lombia with regards to drug trafficking.  Constructivism reveals that dif-
ferent people have varying social constructions and perceptions of what 
constitutes success.  Overall, it should be noted that Plan Colombia has 
had “partial successes” since violence decreased.53  However, in terms of 
drug trafficking and drug production, Plan Colombia has been a failure 
and even counterproductive as the aerial spraying programs have had di-
sastrous environmental and health consequences.54 
Plan Colombia II
After years of continued failures, Colombian authorities outlined a new 
Plan Colombia, referred to as Plan Colombia II.  This initiative was quite 
different from Plan Colombia because the Colombian government desired 
to drastically alter the priorities and goals of the initiative.  The initiative 
was estimated to cost $43 billion, and instead of spending 80 percent of 
the money on military related issues, Plan Colombia II emphasized “soft” 
components. Specifically, Plan Colombia II stressed the importance of 
development, as opposed to spending billions of dollars on controversial 
and counterproductive programs such as the aerial spraying campaigns. 
According to The Miami Herald, “58 percent of the money would go to-
ward economic and social projects, including strengthening human rights 
and the justice system, long thought to be weak points in the Colombian 
government”.55  Plan Colombia II was a step in the right direction and 
a realization on the part of the U.S. that the policies must change, and 
Washington cannot continue the same futile policies.  However, Plan Co-
53  Bagley, Bruce. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major 
Trends in the Twenty First Century (Woodrow Wilson, Washington, D.C.:2012), 3-5. 
54  María Clemencia Ramírez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, “Colombia: 
A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” in Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs 
and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Ri-
enne, 2005).
55  Steven Dudely, “Plan Colombia II: Empahsis on Economy.” Latin American Post, 
sec. Economics/Business & Markets.  Colombia’s Strategy for Strengthening Democra-
cy and Promoting Social Development (2007-2013) (Washington, D.c.: National Plan-
ning Department (DNP); Department of Justice and Security (DJS), 2007). 
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lombia II never came to fruition, and instead of introducing a new costly 
initiative, Washington has cut aid to Colombia.56 
“Plan Mexico”
Washington has continued to ignore the lessons from history.  From 2000 
to 2012, the U.S. government spent $8 billion attempting to combat drug 
trafficking in Colombia under the auspices of Plan Colombia.57  History 
teaches scholars and analysts that drug trafficking is a dangerous business 
and is not stagnant, as drug traffickers must adapt in order to avoid detec-
tion and elude government authorities.58 Washington’s focus on Colombia 
has caused the routes to shift or “balloon out” towards other countries, 
such as Mexico. This is what policy experts refer to as the balloon effect. 
The balloon effect occurs when a government focuses on one area and 
drug production and trafficking move to other regions.  This is not a new 
phenomenon but has occurred throughout history.59
The aforementioned balloon effect caused drug trafficking and violence to 
shift to Mexico. The Bush Administration identified the drug trafficking 
problem in Mexico as a major security dilemma.  Mexico and the U.S. are 
interdependent. Both countries share a large border, and the two coun-
tries have a long history and are connected in many ways.  For example, 
the Mexican government and Washington have trade agreements, such as 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The large border 
that the countries share enables drugs to enter into the U.S.  As a result, 
the Bush Administration sought to combat drug trafficking in Mexico, 
and, therefore developed an initiative known as “Plan Mexico”.  The origi-
nal name of the initiative, Plan Mexico, eventually changed to the Mérida 
56  Adiraan Alsema, “Plan Colombia Not Mentioned in US 2011 Budget Proposal.” Co-
lombia Reports, sec. News, Feb. 2010.  Also, see Adriaan Alsemam, “US Plans 15% Cut 
to Plan Colombia.” Colombia Reports, Feb. 2011. 
57  Bagley, Bruce. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends 
in the Twenty First Century (Woodrow Wilson, Washington, D.C.:2012), 5. 
58 Adiraan, Alsema. “Plan Colombia Not Mentioned in US 2011 Budget Proposal”. Co-
lombia Reports, sec. News. 
59  David R. Mares, Drug Wars and Coffeehouses : The Political Economy of the Interna-
tional Drug Trade (Washington, D.C. : CQ Press), 188.; Bagley, The New Hundred Years 
War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America, pp. 161-182
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Initiative due to the controversies of Plan Colombia.  Even though the 
name changed, the basic policies of the Bush Administration stayed the 
same despite the fact that drug cultivation increased in some regions of 
Colombia.  The Bush Administration, therefore, thought that the same 
framework and plan would succeed in Mexico with fewer resources.60  It 
is not clear why Washington believed that the Merida Initiative, a $1.4 
billion proposal, would succeed when Plan Colombia failed to decrease 
drug trafficking.61 
Violence in Mexico
Mexico has witnessed major increases in violence.  President Felipe 
Calderón (2006-2012) came to power and vowed to battle the drug traf-
fickers, who are ravaging Mexico with no regard for human life as they 
battle for drug routes and territory.  The type of violence and the nature 
of the crimes in Mexico have changed.  In the past, Mexico experienced 
targeted violence against certain individuals or groups.  However, Mexico 
has witnessed indiscriminate attacks again civilians.  In 2008, for instance, 
an explosion occurred during the Independence Day celebrations, injur-
ing more than 100 people.  Mexican officials later stated that the attacks 
had been carried out by criminal organizations operating in Mexico.  Such 
events can best be classified as narco-terrorism. Terrorism, by definition, 
is the indiscriminate killing of people. Leaders of the Mexican govern-
ment confirmed that such act should be classified as one of terrorism. 
Leonel Godoy, the Michoacan governor, stated that “‘we have no doubt 
this is an act of terrorism”.62
Mexico also has experienced mass killings of people and discovered the 
locations of the corpses.  In April of 2011, for instance, Mexican author-
60  It is important to recognize that differences do exist between the Mérida Initiative 
and Plan Colombia.  For more, see John Bailey, Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative: 
Policy Twins or Distant Cousins?, 2009, 
61  Sara Llana Miller and Sibylla Brodzinsky. 2010. Halting drug war corruption: What 
Mexico can learn from Colombia. Christian Science Monitor2010, sec World; “Merida 
Initiative “Plan Mexico” Fact Sheet.” accessed 2010.  Also, see Carlsen, Laura. “Plan Mex-
ico”. Foreign Policy in Focus (-10-30, 2007): N_A. 
62  Ellingwood, Ken. “Blast Targeting Civilians Kill Seven”. Los Angeles Times,2008, sec. 
Bagley, Bruce Michael, and William O. Walker,  Drug trafficking in the Americas (Coral 
Gables, Fl: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1994).
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ities found the bodies of 59 people who had been murdered as a result 
of the violence among the different gangs operating within Mexico.  The 
manner in which the criminals killed the victims represents a shift in 
crime.  An official in Tamaulipas, Morelos Conseco Gomes, argued that 
“it appeared to be a new kind of crime, one in which criminals ‘stop the 
bus, select passengers, [and] take them hostage”.63
Violence has not only been confined to Mexico but has spilled over the 
border, and many U.S. officials have witnessed an increase in the numbers 
of violent incidents as well as robberies in the U.S.  In one Arizona city, 
law enforcement developed a tactical squad to respond to such home in-
vasions, which seem to be increasing as time passes. In fact, officials noted 
that 200 homes were invaded as of March 2009 in this small town alone. 
These home invasions were not ordinary robberies; law enforcement of-
ficials argue that 75 percent of the home invasions have been related to 
drugs and the lucrative drug trade.64  Such examples reveal that violence 
has crossed the border and created a security issue for law enforcement 
in the U.S.  Mexican cartels have spread their organizations and networks 
across the U.S. and were operating in 230 cities, including Anchorage, At-
lanta, Boston, and Billings, Montana, in 2009 according to a report issued 
by the Justice Department.65  Organized criminal networks in the U.S. 
have become a major security problem. President Obama has been forced 
to address the current situation in Mexico as various elected officials have 
called for action.  For instance, the governor of Texas, Rick Perry, request-
ed that Obama line the U.S.-Mexican border with the National Guard to 
protect the U.S.66
President Santos: Strategic Shifts
Uribe came to power in Colombia and aligned closely with the Bush Ad-
ministration, seeking to combat the guerrillas.  Colombian President Juan 
Manuel Santos (2010-2014) has taken a different approach to the war on 
63  Malking, Elisabeth. “Mexican Authorities, Investigating Hijacking, Find 59 Bodies”. 
The New York Times, 2011, sec. Americas. 
64  Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S.” 
The New York Times, 2009, sec. U.S. 
65  Ibid., 2
66  Ibid., 2
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drugs.  Santos argues that a serious discussion must occur with regards 
to the drug war.  In fact, he has admitted to being open to legalization, 
stating that “‘it is an alternative that we can discuss. I am not opposed to 
any formula that is effective”.67 Santos proves to be open to any alternatives 
that would help reduce the violence.  In an interview, he asserted: 
I would talk about legalising marijuana and more than just marijuana. If 
the world thinks that this is the correct approach, because for example in 
our case we used to be exporters, but we were replaced by the producers 
of California. And there was even a referendum in California to legalise 
it and they lost it but they could have won. I ask myself how would you 
explain marijuana being legalised in California and cocaine consumption 
being penalized in Idaho? It’s a contradiction. So it’s a difficult problem 
where you set the limits. It’s a difficult decision. For example, I would 
never legalise very hard drugs like morphine or heroin because in fact 
they are suicidal drugs. I might consider legalising cocaine if there is a 
world consensus because this drug has affected us most here in Colombia. 
I don’t know what is more harmful, cocaine or marijuana. That’s a health 
discussion. But again, only if there is a consensus.68
This quote demonstrates that Santos has recognized the failure of the war 
on drugs and the devastating consequences that such policies have had on 
Colombia.  This is a fundamental shift away from the Uribe Administra-
tion, who was closely aligned with the Bush Administration.  
The Santos Administration is at a critical juncture, as the U.S. has stopped 
funding Plan Colombia and does not want to provide billions of dollars in 
aid to the Colombian government for counternarcotics programs. Obama 
inherited two wars from the Bush Administration which have cost tril-
lions of dollars.  In addition, the U.S. is experiencing the worst economic 
crisis since the great depression as a result of the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. Different actors, such as the Tea Party, are demanding that Wash-
ington cut costs.  Obama is focusing on the economy and wants the Co-
lombian government to solve its own problems.
67 “Colombian president supports legalizing drugs if it reduces violence and crime,” 
Mercopress, Feb. 201.  
68 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/13/colombia-juan-santos-war-on-
drugs
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Alternative Strategies: Demand Reduction
Since Nixon’s declaration of the war on drugs over forty years ago, the 
United States has spent an estimated $1 trillion fighting the war on drugs.69 
Yet, drug consumption in the U.S. today is extremely high because drugs 
remain cheaper and easier to obtain than when the war on drugs began. 
The current financial crisis has caused many government officials to ar-
gue the need for decreases in spending and more efficient and responsible 
policies.  A great place to cut costs is the failed war on drugs.  Instead of 
focusing only on supply-side issues, the U.S. should concentrate on reduc-
ing demand among its own population.  The use of addictive substances 
over the past forty years has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thou-
sands of people from overdoses and other diseases caused by drug use.70 
A better way to solve organized crime is to focus on decreasing demand 
and providing people with affordable means of receiving treatment for 
addictions.  
Massive Incarcerations
The war on drugs has resulted in the prosecution and incarceration of mil-
lions of people in the United States.  Research by various criminologists 
and legal scholars has been conducted on the need for systematic prison 
reform.  The U.S. cannot continue to build prisons fast enough to house 
all the inmates, and overcrowding forces inmates to live in abysmal condi-
tions in prison.  In addition, prisoners are surrounded by other individuals 
charged with drug trafficking.  In essence, prisons have becomes “schools 
of crime.”  Even after serving their time, inmates are punished by society. 
Michele Alexander argues that ex-convicts are still treated like criminals 
after they serve their sentences.  For example, felons are denied access to 
69  Wasted Tax Dollars, Drug Policy Alliance New York, N.Y., http://www.drugpolicy.
org/wasted-tax-dollars
70  Ethan Nadelmann, “DRUGS,” Foreign Policy, no. 162 (Sep/Oct 2007, 2007), 24-
26,28,30.; Ethan Nadelmann, “Addicted to Failure,” Foreign Policy, no. 137 (Jul/Aug 
2003, 2003), 94-94.; Nadelmann, Ethan Nadelmann/ Uso y Prohibicion De Drogas, 13-13; 
Musto, The American Disease :Origins of Narcotic Control, 414; Nadelmann, Ethan Na-
delmann/ Uso y Prohibicion De Drogas, 13-13; Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Criminologist and 
Punitive Drug Prohibition: To serve or to Challenge?” Criminology & Public Policy 3, no. 
3 (Jul 2004, 2004), 441-450.
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public housing by the government.  In addition, felons are often shunned 
by family members and former friends who do not want to associate with 
criminals.  The state of Florida denies student loans to felons and, in turn, 
prevents these individuals from trying to better themselves and receive an 
education.  The prospects for a low-skilled individual of receiving a job 
where they can pay their bills and support themselves and their family are 
quite bleak.  Employers also often hesitate before hiring felons.71 
After being denied access to jobs, housing, and student loans, it should 
not be a surprise to anyone that felons are forced back into a life of crime. 
It becomes a rational choice for a convicted drug dealer to return to sell-
ing drugs, because an individual can make more money in an hour than 
an entire days work at a fast food restaurant. The prison system is funda-
mentally destroying youth as ex-convicts return to society angry, bitter, 
and have almost no chance of succeeding or making an honest living.  It, 
therefore, is time for a radical change in the penitentiary system and for 
Washington to stop ignoring the advice of scholars and other members of 
epistemic communities who have proposed various ideas for reform.     
Legalization
The statistics are quite clear: the war on drugs has been a failure. As long 
as there is a market, drug trafficking will continue to occur.  Serious dis-
cussions have occurred about the legalization of drugs.  Ethan Nadel-
mann has become the leading advocate of legalization. He argues that 
drug policies have been very harmful, and Washington cannot continue 
spending billions of dollars fighting this counterproductive war.  Legal-
ization would reduce the profits of the drug traffickers and would enable 
the government to earn money from taxes.  Legalizing other substances, 
such as cocaine or heroin, is a more difficult sell for politicians because 
of the disastrous health effects of using such drugs.   The argument for 
legalization of such substances is that these drugs could be laced with oth-
er harmful or deadly chemicals and could result in deaths and increases 
in hospitalizations.  A drug that is regulated by the government is safer 
because it would not have other toxins. The government could promote 
71  Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblind-
ness (New York: New Press; Distributed by Perseus Distribution, 290.
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programs, such as clean needle exchange, in order to decrease the spread 
of infectious diseases, such as HIV, among drug users.72  
While the complete legalization of drugs currently is not a viable political 
option, the decriminalization of drugs is a policy that is easier to “sell.” 
The U.S. cannot continue incarcerating millions of Americans and must 
decriminalize the possession of misdemeanor and “lower level” drug vi-
olations.  The great recession in the U.S. has led many to call for smarter 
spending.73  The next step for Washington, therefore, is to “de-securitize” 
the war on drugs.  
Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Copenhagen School analyze the 
securitization process.  However, Buzan and his coauthors do not discuss 
the process of de-securitization, which can be accomplished by reversing 
the process of securitization.74  The U.S. must stop marketing and promot-
ing the war on drugs and viewing drug addiction as a security issue.  In-
stead, drug consumption should be viewed as a health issue.  Washington 
cannot continue to destroy millions of lives by imprisoning millions and 
ruining the lives of future generations with such archaic policies. 
It also is important to note that the criminal justice system has a great deal 
of lobbyist and employs millions of people.  Operating a prison requires 
people to work in the prison. Prisons must house, feed, and provide other 
resources for inmates. Millions of people work for government agencies, 
such as the DEA, and their careers are devoted to stopping drug produc-
tion, consumption, and trafficking. Therefore, one must understand that 
the criminal justice system has many people who benefit from the current 
system and do not want to change the status quo.75   
72  Nadelmann, Addicted to Failure, 94-94; Nadelmann, Drugs, 24-26,28,30; Nadel-
mann, Ethan Nadelmann/ Uso y Prohibicion De Drogas, 13-13; Nadelmann, Criminolo-
gists and Punitive Drug Prohibition: to Serve or to Shallenge?, 441-450; Ethan A. Nadel-
mann, “Thinking Seriously about Alternatives to Drug Prohibition”, Daedalus 121, no. 31 
(Summer 1992, 1992), 85-85.; Mark Thornton, The Economics of Prohibition (Salt Lake 
City : University of Utah Press), 184.; Peter Andreas, “Dead-End Drug Wars”. Foreign 
Policy, no. 85 (-12-01, 1991), 106-128.
73  For more on legalization, see Bagley, The New Hundred Years War? US National Se-
curity and the War on Drugs in Latin America, pp. 161-182, 176
74  Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security : a New Framework for Analysis, 239
75  Todd R. Clear and Natasha  A. Frost, “Private Prisons”. Criminology & Public Policy 
1, no. 3 (2002), 425-426.
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Conclusion
This work has traced the development and implementation of Plan Co-
lombia.  Various theories have been invoked to understand U.S. drug poli-
cies and initiatives.  The argument is that too many international relations 
scholars are more concerned about proving the merits of their theories as 
opposed to using the appropriate theories required to answer the ques-
tions.  Realism, liberalism, and constructivism help explain the evolution 
of Plan Colombia.  Realism sheds light on the long term goal of the U.S.: 
maintain its position as the hegemon. Realism also helps explain how 
the more powerful country, the U.S., was able to dictate the terms and 
conditions of Plan Colombia to the Pastrana administration.76  On the 
other hand, Liberalism helps experts understand the independent rela-
tionship—albeit asymmetric—between Bogotá and Washington.  Liberal-
ism also sheds light on the global nature of the drug trafficking problem, 
which cannot be solved by one country.77  Washington did not adhere to 
the tenants of liberalism when reformulating Plan Colombia as it ignored 
the need for cooperation between other countries.  In other words, the 
Clinton administration was more concerned about increasing the secu-
rity of the U.S. and combatting drug trafficking in Colombia as opposed 
to developing an international consensus of how to solve the problem. 
Finally, constructivism helps explain the role of perceptions and social 
constructions as well as the securitization of the drug war in Colombia.78 
Advocates of Plan Colombia argue that the initiative achieved its goals, 
while critics assert that the Plan was a failure because Colombia still has 
major challenges with drug trafficking, organized crime, and violence. 
Determining whether Plan Colombia was successful depends on one’s 
perceptions and how one defines success. 
The problem with the U.S. war on drugs is that Washington has not learned 
from the past and continually repeats the same mistakes.79 Drug traffick-
ing routes have started to shift to very weak states, such as Guatemala and 
Haiti.  States with weak institutions and large amounts of corruption are 
ripe for organized crime and drug trafficking.  The time has come for the 
U.S. to change the course and re-think drug policies.
76  Waltz, Theory of International Politics
77  Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye S., Power and Interdependence.
78  Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, Security : a New Framework for Analysis
79  Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Drug Cartel Violence Spills Over, Alarming U.S”. 
The New York Times,2009, sec. U.S.; “Merida Initiative “Plan Mexico” Fact Sheet”, ac-
cessed 2010,  www.witnessforpeace.org. 
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